Viewpoint
By Ijaz Hussain
(Photo source :
(Photo source :
dailytimes.com.pk
If a single issue can define the 13th SAARC summit it is most likely to be the enlargement. Seven South Asian states founded the grouping in 1985. After the passage of 20 years, they have decided to admit Afghanistan, more of a Central Asian than a South Asian state though it has close cultural, political and economic ties with the region. Along with Afghan membership, they also approved “in principle” China’s application for observer status in the grouping. What is the significance of these developments?
We begin by identifying some features unique to the enlargement. First, it relates to an extra-regional player. This constitutes a departure from the conceptual moorings of the grouping. Second, unlike countries seeking membership of a high performing body, Afghanistan has sought membership of a grouping about which there is not much to write back home. Third, Afghanistan has become the only SAARC country with which India neither enjoys a common border nor a dispute. It will be the only member with which the latter is likely to enjoy a complete strategic understanding on Pakistan.
Afghanistan has always been a security nightmare for Pakistan, particularly when it acts in tandem with India. Taking advantage of Pakistan’s wariness of such a scenario the two countries have often tried to synchronise their moves. That explains Pakistan’s preference for a regime in Kabul that is favourably disposed towards it. There is little doubt that in SAARC India and Afghanistan will move in concert. Thus the Afghan membership does not augur well for Pakistan. How then do we explain Pakistan’s decision not to exercise its veto on Afghan candidature for the SAARS membership?
One possible reason could be a desire on the part of Pakistan to win Afghan goodwill. This, obviously, could not have been achieved by opposing the Afghan application. The fact that Indo-Afghan strategic understanding on Pakistan is not dependent on whether or not Afghanistan is a member of the SAARC must have been a factor in Pakistan’s decision.
Another reason could be Pakistan’s desire not to be blamed for the failure of the summit. The combined effect of the veto and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz’s statement linking the implementation of SAFTA with the resolution of the Kashmir dispute could have been too much. Besides, Pakistan could not have presented China’s case for the observer status while at the same time blocking the Afghan candidature.
Irrespective of the considerations that prevailed, Pakistan demonstrated a lot of maturity in handling the question. For example, it did not go along with the members that argued that “instead of expanding the group, emphasis should be on coordination amongst the original members”. Nor did it support Nepal, which linked the Afghan candidature with the grant of observer status to China. Incidentally, Pakistan’s voting behaviour in the matter stands in sharp contrast to that of Afghanistan at the UN in September 1947 when it cast a negative vote against Pakistan’s candidature.
For India, the Afghan membership of SAARC represents a great diplomatic success. To begin with it could result in cooling down Pakistan’s ardour for amending Article 10 of the SAARC charter — which strictly prohibits the raising of “bilateral and contentious issues” in the SAARC deliberations — because of the putative Afghan threat to raise the Pakhtoonistan issue. The Afghan presence will forever free India from the incubus of being shackled by the SAARC Lilliputians. Finally, the Afghan membership could be a handy stick to beat Pakistan with for its refusal to allow the passage of Indian goods through its territory to Afghanistan. It was pointed out after the summit that the matter has a bilateral character and does not fall within the SAARC ambit. However, the temptation will always be there for the two countries to exploit the issue to blame Pakistan for obstructing the cause of regional trade.
Another issue relating to the enlargement of SAARC concerned China’s request for induction as a dialogue partner or an observer. China had informally sounded out SAARC members on the matter in the past. However, this was the first time it made a formal request. During the SAARC foreign ministers’ conference, which had preceded the summit to fix the agenda, there were reports of India’s strong opposition to the Chinese request. However, it climbed down on the issue. The Chinese request along with that of Japan, which is also keen to get the observer status, will now be taken up early next year after the formulation of modalities and guidelines on the issue. Why did India drag its feet in the matter?
China reportedly tried to obstruct the Indian request for the grant of observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. However, the Indian reservation in the present situation was motivated less by the spirit of retaliation and more by the consideration that its presence in SAARC could affect the Indian clout in the grouping. India did not veto the Chinese request because it could not have done that while it was advocating the Afghan request for membership. Besides, it did not want to be the odd man out on this question. However, conscious of the challenge posed by the grant of observer status to China it sought to balance it by supporting Japan’s candidature for a similar status. India has reportedly made it absolutely clear that it is averse to the idea of China becoming a full member of SAARC.
The manner and the method in which China was accepted “in principle” exposes India’s standing in the comity of SAARC nations. It is noteworthy that the Afghan membership of SAARC was considered a done deal on the eve of the Dhaka summit. However, King Gyanendra of Nepal held up consensus on the issue for two days by linking it to the Chinese request. No member came to India’s rescue except for Bhutan (with which China does not have diplomatic relations), which lent support on procedural delay. It is indeed a measure of Chinese clout that it was able to ensure a favourable decision even without being present in the SAARC. This debunks the Indian claim of South Asia being its sphere of influence.
Finally, some analysts have welcomed the induction of extra-regional players in SAARC on the ground that injection of fresh blood might reinvigorate the grouping. This optimism could prove utterly unfounded. There is a clear danger of Afghanistan bringing to SAARC deliberations the animus that it has always carried in its bilateral relations with Pakistan. By manifesting itself through combined Indo-Afghan moves this could exacerbate the rivalry between India and Pakistan that is already the bane of SAARC. Similarly, should China and Japan get SAARC membership, the Indian reservations notwithstanding, their growing antagonism might spill over into the grouping. If this comes to pass we may rue the induction of new entrants into SAARC.
The writer is a former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University, Pakistan. This article is reproduced here courtesy Daily Times, a Pakistani newspaper. Nepalnews doesn’t necessarily subscribe to the views expressed in its Opinion columns.