Kathmandu: After twenty months of intense politicking, the country has got the closest to a national government that for the first time since the Maoist insurgency can talk to the Maoists with the confidence that it has the bulk national opinion behind it. Now that the budget has demonstrated that the government can agree with itself on a fiscal policy, the process appears on, to initiate the much-awaited dialogue with the Maoists. So much is fine.

However, this is not that meets the eye. Contradictory standpoints on even the fiscal policy already declared by government publicly suggest that even the talks with the Maoists will have members of government talking to themselves when the talks should be with the Maoists.

Although the concept of the “peace secretariat” has been adopted hinting that this organ will be solely in charge of the talks, party dictates to government on how the talks should take place make evident that contradictions within the shaky coalition will continue to effect the talks which is one major rationale of the government itself.

The key issue for the Maoists as highlighted by its proponents is what is deemed as Nepal’s civic society is that talks can only take place upon the cessation of armed conflict. This would mean that both the parties cease firing. This would mean that the army restrict itself to the barracks. This would also mean that the Maoists be allowed its presence outside the barracks albeit without arms. Now that they have ensured that civil competition to their organization in the countryside is limited to urban centers how this lopsided security situation will be allowed by authorities aware that it is merely the security forces that gives the state a semblance of balance in the countryside is any body’s guess.

Again Maoists voices in civic society suggest that government has denied the preliminaries itself. Since the insurgency if for a constituent assembly that gives the people a choice for a republic, the agenda for talks has been negated at the very outset by government saying that it will not talk on constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy.

This belligerent standpoint on part of the Maoists makes evident its confidence this round that any compromise on part of government for sake of talks will be capitalized as a concession by the “old regime”.

These indicators make evident the difference between Maoists postures during the previous talks and the current one. It appears that the insurgents are aware that what they call the old-regime has been so conveniently been stalemated by contradictions within that they can impress their will upon them through sheer force of strength given the urgency for peace.

There is meaning therefore in Prime Minister Deuba’s repeated comments that the talks this round must yield results if they are at all to take place and they must be more than for sake of talks as previously.

But the hitch lies here. Contradictions with government itself and among the constitutional forces are likely to impede Deuba’s determination. The Maoists are skillfully playing with its UML contacts to hasten the talks. Girija Koirala’s urgency to undermine Deuba makes sure that he has his own Maoists cards. At least one “constitutional” party—the United people’s Front is known for its links with the Maoists. Civic society fronts for the Maoists gain from media presence echoing the public desire for peace.

It is these that are real challenges to the talks. Amidst the ignorance of the security component in the talks, the possibility of the talks yielding lasting peace and permanent political solutions becomes remote. Much will depend on whether the government demonstrates its required cohesiveness for the talks to yield targeted results. The Maoists at least know their targets and have pursued it well.