The dilemma now is that a weak democratic centre cannot negotiate with the Maoists from a position of strength
By Dr. Gunther Baechler
1. Recipes for confrontation
There are two different types of polarization: political and military.
Politically the seven political parties and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in the recent past managed to move closer together. Beyond this, the political parties and civil society organizations mobilized street protests throughout the country. The municipal elections of February 8 were boycotted. The political gap between the Palace and the seven parties is wider than ever during the last 15 years; the royalist parties are divided, too (see figure 1).
Some actors fear that both the parties and the CPN (Maoist) will manage to further isolate the King and to finally abolish the monarchy. Once the monarchy will be finished off the Maoists are supposed to have an easy game with the political parties and consequently will be able to take over power in Kathmandu. Against this threat scenario, some international actors have urged the parties and the King to conduct talks soon and marginalize the Maoists completely (see figure 2).
In the first case (fig. 1) the Palace aims to avoid its isolation or abolishment. The King uses the armed forces (RNA and the armed police) in order to crackdown on the political mass movement in the Kathmandu valley and to a lesser extent in the districts. A democratic upheaval has become more of a threat for the throne than the Maoist rebellion.
In the second case (fig. 2) the CPN (M) uses military force (People’s Army) to avoid political isolation and finally societal marginalization due to an externally promoted process of democratization combined with a strong constitutional monarchy.
Only two of the three actors – the Palace and the Maoists – dispose of armed forces in order to shape the triangle according to their respective political interests. The outcome of this struggle might be a military bipolarization which further weakens the political actors using democratic means to defend their interests (see figure 3). It can easily lead in a split of the seven party alliance (or a division of parties) in pro-Palace and pro-Maoist constituencies.
The weakening or splitting of the political parties is synonym to the squeezing of the democratic political centre among the two armed actors. Such situation can easily escalate in the use of more armed violence among the two actors as well as in a radicalization of parts of the democratic centre, This scenario, in turn, is designed to further marginalize the peace constituencies in the country.
Unity among external actors in order to support the democratic movement as well as to put pressure (a) on the Palace to join in and (b) on the Maoist to give up armed violence is still fragile and therefore had little impact on the parties to conflict.
2. Recipes for peace
We elaborated on the question which shape political confrontation and armed violence takes. The second question is: what shape do peace and cooperation in Nepal have?
War tends to be bipolar – peace is triangular. The triangle becomes reality if all three parties to the conflict agree to promote a political solution to the crisis and if all of them are prepared for talks about the future political order in Nepal (see figure 4).
How to promote a peace process that leads from insane bipolar and asymmetric situation to a sound and regular triangle?
Two of the three parties have already agreed on a common political agenda for a peace process in Nepal (through the 12- point understanding). The Palace refuses to acknowledge the existence of the understanding. Rather, it (the Palace) is unilaterally following its own road map which triggered a dual result: on one hand the royal strategy pushed the two other parties to conflict into one and the same corner and on the other hand it contributed to its own political and international isolation.
Then, how to establish the “peace triangle”?
First, the political interest in a peaceful solution must become a dominant factor in the triangular conflict system. Interest normally is defined by a mix of factors such as: (self) perception, strength and fears, opportunities, and outside pressure. Both, internal as well as external actors can influence each one of these factors and finally the mix as such in order to promote a peaceful transformation of the crisis.
As far as internal actors are concerned in the last six months or so, the democratic forces triggered a political movement throughout the country aimed at promoting a peace process. The movement was only partly successful. Mainly the repression used by the Palace put the democratic centre at risk.
The dilemma now is that a weak democratic centre cannot negotiate with the Maoists from the position of strength. However, sustainable peace depends on an empowered democratic centre strong enough to urge: the Palace to draw a different road map which is driven by political rather than military issues; the new map must guide the Palace back into the triangular position.
· the Maoists to joint the political mainstream. Since the 12- point understanding leaves many questions open, a second round of talks is necessary in order to define architecture and design of a peace process much more in detail.
Unity among external actors in order to support the democratic movement as well as to put pressure (a) on the Palace to join in and (b) on the Maoist to give up armed violence is still fragile and therefore had little impact on the parties to conflict. In fact internal activities and external pressure have to go hand in hand to shape the conflict system differently.
What are the options available to the international community (IC)?
1.) The IC should engage in a process to compare notes and to speak with one voice.
2.) The IC should promote and support further talks among the political parties and the CPN/M. The result of these talks should a) put an end to the use of armed violence; b) condemn human rights violations; c) embark in a meaningful peace process, and d) strengthen the political culture of dispute.
3.) The IC should apply a strategy of pressure and incentives in order to push the Palace back in to the triangular position.
4.) Provide both professional and technical expertise for an inclusive peace process (build individual and institutional capacities; assist in solving constitutional problems; support electoral processes).
Experiences from many internal conflicts show that the parties to conflict want to engage in a peace process. However, they don’t know how and when to do so – and without losing their face or putting their highly paid position at risk. We assume that the same holds true for Nepal.
The conflict in Nepal can be solved politically and the Nepali themselves best know how to do it. Fortunately it’s not a crisis that is so deep rooted that the parties to conflict won’t be able to talk to each other any more. However, they need assistance in order to do so without losing face.
As a rule it becomes the role of external third parties to initiate and control the process – and not the content or the final settlement. Nepal might be an exception – which does not seem to be the case, however. That is the reason why the IC should think about a third party facilitation that is process-oriented and non-interventionist in style (see figure 5).
This does not mean that all three parties have to come together immediately. There will be different tracks, different “speeds”, and different approaches. In the present context third parties have the following options: To
a) facilitate talks among the political parties and the CPN (M) in order to stop armed violence, promote an all-inclusive peace process and balance the power asymmetry among the two parties due to the fact that one of them disposes of armed forces.
b) keep reliable channels to the Palace open in order to promote a dialogue orientation. The IC should leave the King with one option only: to provide a serious offer for talks to the seven political parties and the CPN (M) addressing the catalogue of major issues at stake.
This approach acknowledges that different actors together with the international community have specific roles to play – that’s why, collaboration and coordination is important. It also takes into consideration that India– as the most important neighbour– has a special relationship with Nepal; due to close cultural ties, increasing interdependence, open borders, and security issues.
A senior official with the Swiss Foreign Ministry, Dr. Baechler is the special advisor for peace-buildng in Nepal. This paper was presented by him at a programme organised by the Ganesh Man Singh Academy in Kathmandu early this week—Ed.
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