The peace process has been ineffective partly because the process lacks some very important components– there is no mechanism for sustaining peace at the grassroots level
– By Anga R. Timilsina
Anga R. TimilsinaIn Nepal, both sides—the government and the Maoists, are currently wrangling over the nuts and bolts of the peace process. What comes first, the arms management or political issues? This is the major talking point for Nepal’s different political constituencies. For Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala, the arms management is the core issue of Nepal’s peace process, whereas for the Maoists, the lack of agreement on political issues is the big stumbling block. Nonetheless, all eyes have turned towards the next summit talks scheduled on October 8 th and will be held between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) leaders and the Maoist negotiation team to be led by Maoist Supremo Prachanda.
The Problems
The mistrust developed during last three months is the crux of the problem. The government and some factions of the SPA seem to be suspicious about the real intentions of the Maoists. There is suspicion that the Maoists may join and use the mainstream politics so long as it benefits them. The violation of the spirit of the ongoing peace process by continuing (if not increasing) the activities, such as use of violence against those who do not submit to them, forced donations, forced unionization campaigns, abductions, and even killings, has questioned the Maoists’ true intentions. Moreover, the Maoist denial to keep their army inside cantonments until there is an agreement on political issues has further added to the existing suspicion. Some argue that if this is just another Maoists’ tactic to secure maximum concession from SPA, one should not be scared of it. However, if it is a strategy to use both the dialogue and their military capacity to achieve their ideological objectives, this is really scary and the SPA should be very careful.
On the other hand, the Maoists have been suspicious about Prime Minister Koirala’s true intention. The Maoists blame that Prime Minister Koirala is yielding to foreign pressure. US Ambassador James F. Moriarty’s recent journey to the army barracks located in the western and far-western regions further fueled the mistrust. His barrack journey was perceived by many as a ploy to sabotage Nepal’s peace process. The Maoists became more suspicious about Koirala’s intention when the government appointed General Rookmangad Katawal to the post of Chief of Army Staff (CoAS). General Katawal is considered to be a royal protégé and has also been criticized by many civil society organizations for his human rights record during the people’s movement in April. Amid General Katawal’s appointment, the rumor about the Nepal Army’s import of weapons from Ukraine through India also contributed to the increasing mistrust between the government and the Maoists.
Besides the mistrust developed between the Maoists and the government, much of the problem in Nepal’s peace process has been accumulated by three things. First, there is no effective mechanism for monitoring the code of conduct and agreements that have been previously signed. For example, the 25-point code of conduct clearly mentions that there should be an end to the forced extortion, torture and killings but neither the civil society’s monitoring body formed by the government and the Maoists negotiation teams nor the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nation’s human rights monitoring body, has been effective in stopping the Maoist atrocities.
Second, the peace process has been ineffective partly because the process lacks some very important components. There is no mechanism for sustaining peace at the grassroots level. Padma Ratna Tuladhar, a facilitator of the government-Maoist peace talks in 2001 and 2003, recently pointed out that there is a need to form a standing peace council at district levels in order to ensure smooth progress of peace talks. He argued, “Till now, we have seen that talks between PM Girija Prasad Koirala and Maoist Chairman Prachanda have been able to break deadlocks. What if, they, too, cannot break deadlocks in future?” It should be noted that effective peace-building requires a successful reintegration at the community level. The effective local governance substantially helps in bringing the rebels into the mainstream by providing a mechanism to deal with the issues related to community-based rehabilitation and reintegration, return of refugees and internally displaced persons, property rights, justice and reconciliation, healing process, and revival of essential infrastructure and services. Visiting Danish Minister for Development Cooperation, Ulla Tornaes, rightly pointed out, “As peace negotiations progress at the national level, it is crucial that consultation, coordination and dialogue mechanisms are established at the local level to ensure that basic services can reach the Nepali people. Demilitarization of the countryside is much more than decommissioning or disarmament – it must include reconciliation and building a future together.” Moreover, smooth running of the peace talks have also been suffered from the lack of practical monitoring and dispute resolution mechanisms at both national and local levels. Another missing component of Nepal’s peace process is not giving appropriate role to the “observers.” Mr. Tuladhar, one of the observers, while pointing out to the unsystematic nature of the process recently mentioned that the observers heard about the summit meeting through media.
Third, the inability of the SPA to reach to common positions before going to a submit talk with the Maoists is also contributing to the postponement of the peace talks. The SPA has seven different visions and seriously lacks enough homework. For example, instead of taking the issues to the SPA meeting or Prime Minister Koirala, Madhav Kumar Nepal, General Secretary of the United Marxist and Leninist (UML), blamed the Prime Minister Koirala for the delay in the peace talks.
The Contentious Issues
Although, as portrayed by the Maoists, the issue of monarchy–mainly the role of monarchy during the interim period and the timing of referendum on monarchy, seems to be a major political issue, this issue is not likely to be a major stumbling block. Prime Minister Koirala, the UML and the Nepali Congress (D) have agreed at least in theory that the issue of monarchy should be resolved by the verdict of people regardless whether people should cast their vote through the referendum or the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections. However, there are three main issues that are likely to stall Nepal’s peace process.
First, in the interim constitution, the Maoists have proposed a mechanism for state restructuring. Critics argue that the Maoist model of state restructuring, which divides Nepal into nine zones, such as “Khumbuwan Zone, “Madhesh Zone,” “Kirat Zone,” and so on, is not genuinely aimed at strengthening local governance because it had originally been created to enhance the recruiting in Maoist Army in order to sustain the guerilla war. There is little chance that the SPA will buy the Maoist idea for state restructuring because it is widely believed that the Maoist model of state restructuring will contribute towards the ethnic division by threatening age-old secularism and coexistence of multi-ethnicity. Most importantly, it should be noted that durable institutional change takes time and the reforms like state restructuring should not be done hastily.
Second, the arms management and finalizing its modalities is going to be a real challenge. Both the government and the Maoists are ready to keep their weapons and army under the United Nations (UN) supervision. However, the question regarding what to do with the Maoist militias is likely to be contentious. Some people in the SPA are discussing to have an agreement with the Maoists that anyone who is going to be caught with weapons after the cantonment process will be charged with criminal offenses. On the other hand, the Maoists are arguing that the Armed Police Force of Nepal, a semi-military institution, should be abolished and the Maoist militias should be merged with Nepal Police before the CA elections. It should be noted that the elections will not be held in intimidation-free environment unless the issue of the Maoists militia is resolved.
The formation of the interim parliament is another contentious issue. According to the Maoists, there should be an interim parliament with following composition: 33% members from the SPA, 33% from the Maoists Party, and 33% from Nepal’s civil society. However, it is not easy to find a commonly accepted formula or a guiding principle for forming the interim parliament. Some people within the SPA are unwilling to include the members of civil society arguing that like political parties, civil society should not be overtly interested in politics. Civil society’s job is not to run a government but to make the government aware from the streets. More importantly, whether to include all or some of the members of the reinstated parliament in the interim parliament is going to be another controversial issue.
Likely Results From the October 8 Summit Talks
Several scenarios have been discussed by many analysts including Dr. Devendra Raj Panday, a prominent member of Nepali civil society. The likelihood that the SPA and the Maoists will fail to find a consensus on the above-mentioned contentious issues is as high as the likelihood that they will reach a consensus. Although there are many scenarios, following four scenarios seems to be worth discussing.
In the upcoming summit talks, the SPA and the Maoists should sign the peace and ceasefire agreements even if they fail to reach an agreement on political and arms management issues. The signing of these agreements will serve as confidence-building measure and help keep the talks going. It will also send a positive message to the international community that Nepal’s peace process is on right direction
Scenario 1: Although it may take many hours or couple of days, the summit will be successful. The SPA and the Maoists will sign a comprehensive peace agreement that will include the agreement on the interim constitution, interim parliament, arms management, and state restructuring. They will also announce the date for the CA elections.
Scenario 2: If the Maoists find that the SPA or the government is all set to “maintain the status quo” ( i.e., retaining ceremonial monarchy, not willing to dissolve the reinstated parliament and not willing to yield to the other political demands put forwarded by the Maoists), the Maoists may pull out of the talks and call for mass protests. If the Maoist leaders realize that they have a good chance of cashing people’s frustration against the slow pace of talks and the king-leaning attitude of Prime Minister Koirala, they may do so hoping that they have a good chance to strengthen their support base with their republican slogans. If the protests are peaceful, the SPA and the Maoists will eventually return to peace talks; however, if the violence breaks out during the protests, Nepal may witness the end of the peace process. If Nepal Army is mobilized to quell down the agitation, Nepal will return to a civil war. The United States, India, and other countries are likely to resume their military aid to Nepal government while the Maoists may go back to jungle and resume their guerilla war.
Scenario 3: The SPA and the Maoists will agree on some issues but decide to have another summit talks to finalize the remaining issues. For example, the interim constitution could be finalized once there is an agreement on the role of monarchy. The Maoists and the SPA could also declare the date for the CA elections. They could sign a peace agreement package with ceasefire agreement, human rights agreement, and rehabilitation and reconstruction agreement. They could decide to confine arms and ammunition in the designated places as part of the first stage of the arms management deal. However, they may form task forces to decide on how to deal the issues of Maoist militia and the composition of the interim parliament and agree to discuss the report of the task forces in the follow-up summit talks. Similarly, an agreement to delay the discussion on the state restructuring until the CA elections can not be ruled out.
Scenario 4: The Maoists and the SPA will not be able to reach to an agreement but agree to have next summit talks soon. This scenario is likely because of two things. First, the SPA seems to have spent very little time to do homework because of the Dashain festival. Second, some argue that Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala is not willing to yield to the Maoists on political issues unless he is able to resolve the arms issue with them. On the other hand, the Maoists have made clear that political issues are of primary concern for them, not the (issue of) arms management.
Need to Get Back to the Basics
It seems that Nepal’s peace process has experienced deadlock mainly because it has been deviated from the basics of the peace process. First, the SPA and the government have been criticized for failing to carry out serious homework for the peace talks. After the eight-point agreement signed by the Maoists and the SPA on June 16, there was widespread dissatisfaction among the SPA cadres and party members. Many believed that the SPA was out-negotiated mainly because it lacked enough homework. Learned from the past mistakes, it is very important to have a consensus among the SPA factions before going for October 8 summit talks with the Maoists. If the SPA has a consensus among its factions and if it can provide effective alternatives to the issues raised by the Maoists, it is likely that the SPA will enjoy enough bargaining power to bring the Maoists into the main stream.
Effective peace-building requires a successful reintegration at the community level. The effective local governance substantially helps in bringing the rebels into the mainstream by providing a mechanism to deal with the issues related to community-based rehabilitation and reintegration, return of refugees and internally displaced persons, property rights, justice and reconciliation, healing process, and revival of essential infrastructure and services.
Second, the success of any negotiation is a matter of both psychology and pragmatism. There need some confidence-building measures in order to lubricate the bargaining process towards a successful resolution. In the upcoming summit talks, the SPA and the Maoists should sign the peace and ceasefire agreements even if they fail to reach an agreement on political and arms management issues. The signing of these agreements will serve as confidence-building measure and help keep the talks going. It will also send a positive message to the international community that Nepal’s peace process is on right direction.
Third, critics argue that wrong priorities are impeding Nepal’s peace process. Since the goal of both the government and the Maoists is the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections, priorities of the peace talks should have been the fulfillment CA elections prerequisites, such as creating free and fair environment, crafting the guiding principles of the constitution to be drafted by the CA, finalizing the process and mechanism for holding the elections, and fixing the date of the elections. However, the peace process is revolving around the interim statute and its provisions, such as state restructuring, interim parliament, the king’s position during the interim period, and so on. It is hard to see how spending more time on issues, such as state restructuring and the formation of interim parliament, could contribute significantly to the CA elections. The state restructuring is an issue which is often recommended not to be done in haste and it certainly can wait until the CA elections. Since the formation of an interim parliament may take a lot of time, the CA elections can be held without it as well. Rather than spending a lot of time on thinking about the composition of interim parliament, it seems wiser for SPA and the Maoists to think about some alternatives. For example, a “high level standing committee” comprised of the top leaders of all eight parties (SPA and the Maoist) can be formed to decide on major political issues. The reinstated parliament should go into recess until the CA elections and automatically be dissolved after the first meeting of CA.
Regarding creating an intimidation-free environment, which is major prerequisite for holding CA elections, the arms management and the rehabilitation and reconciliation are two crucial issues. Confining the Maoist arms and army to the cantonments and Nepal Army to the barracks could reduce the fear but security can not be fully ensured without controlling Maoist militias’ atrocities. Thus, what to do with continued atrocities by the Maoist militias should be a major concern. Moreover, if both the Maoists and the government do not agree on the scheme to merge these two armies before the CA elections , the complexity will only be added to the disarmament issues. Both parties need to agree on a plan for decommissioning the Maoist arms before the CA elections.
Finally, one of the major basics of any peace process is that without the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and a people-to-people reconciliation at the local level, no election can be meaningful in conflict-emerged countries. Unfortunately, Nepal’s peace process has so far failed to address these issues. In the upcoming summit talks, the SPA and the Maoists need to agree on establishing an effective mechanism for returning IDPs and forming a truth and justice commission in order to facilitate the reconciliation process.
(Anga R. Timilsina is associated with a US-based think-tank and can be reached at: [email protected]).
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