Indo-Nepal relations: A sorry tale of stagnant water

August 8, 2005
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– Prof. Dr. Surya P. Subedi

Prof. Surya P. Subedi. Photo source: law.leeds.ac.uk

Prof. Surya P. Subedi. Photo source: law.leeds.ac.uk
India and Nepal are probably the closest neighbours on the face of the earth with the greatest number of differences between them. Although they appear to have so much in common, they tend to have difficulties in resolving many vital issues, including border disputes, trade and transit issues and matters relating to co-operation in the water sector. With co-operation and mutual understanding both stand to gain a great deal for the benefit of their respective peoples. Unfortunately, successions of political leaders in both countries have been unable to demonstrate the degree of farsightedness and wisdom required to cultivate and nurture a relationship that does not actually call for much hard work or a major sacrifice to make it flourish. However, the problems persist; a small problem becomes a large and then apparently intractable one.

India and Nepal share not only a long and open border but also a cultural history. A sizeable population of Indian origin live in Nepal and vice versa. This is one reason why the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship accords the nationals of India with national treatment in Nepal (and nationals of Nepal with Indian national treatment in India) in regard of certain industrial, economic and commercial activities. However, the nature and scope of this treaty has been the subject of controversy since its conclusion. Critics have argued that this treaty is based on the `Himalayan frontier policy’ of India, fundamentally a policy pursued by the British during colonial rule which should be changed to reflect the current reality.

Nepal views India’s attitude towards it as old-fashioned and patronising. Nepal is virtually land-locked by India and India has tended to view Nepal as its own backyard. But while India is a huge factor in Nepal’s international relations, Nepal is an important, but relatively small, factor in India’s own foreign policy. India has been critical of the inclination of Nepal’s leaders to adopt the role of an irritant neighbour, incapable of understanding the bilateral relationship from a broader perspective. India views its dealings with Nepal in a regional context, while the latter takes a bilateral view of relations with India.

This outlook has hindered Nepal’s attempts at modernisation and economic development and the misperceptions regarding the asymmetric relationship have often prevented meaningful co-operation between the two neighbours. For instance, Nepal has huge hydroelectric potential but has yet to take advantage of this resource largely because of mistrust of India – the natural market for power.

Indo-Nepal relations are marred by mistrust, confusion and dogmatism mars. It is necessary to develop an environment both in Nepal and India conducive to meaningful co-operation. The perception that India sees Nepal as its own backyard causes resentment in Nepal. And Nepal’s tendency to denigrate its larger neighbour for any perceived ills is equally unhealthy and may ultimately block any effort by the two countries to work together.

Regardless of the present political difficulties in Nepal, India and Nepal need to usher their relations into a new phase, prepared for and capable of facing current challenges. They have to move away from the old dogmas and embrace transparency and democratic norms in the conduct of their relations. For this, the task at hand is to:

Regulate the Indo-Nepal border
Resolve the border disputes such as those relating to Kalapani
Implement the Mahakali River Treaty in a manner which is satisfactory to both parties
Refrain from building unilaterally any new dams along the Indo-Nepal border that have adverse impact on Nepal
Conclude a new friendship treaty to replace the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship
Cancel formally the 1965 Arms Agreement and any other “secret” agreements
Of course, the Maoist problem in Nepal has made the Indo-Nepal relations more complex and further muddied the water of trust between the two countries. Indeed, the Maoist problem began in Nepal in the 1990s with the two main political objectives:

abolishing the monarchy, seen as an obstacle to the economic, social and political development of Nepal
cancelling the “unequal” treaties with India and ending the virtual control of the Nepalese economy by Indian businesses
The intensification of the Maoist campaign in the 1990s drew India closer into the problem. India began to supply more weapons to the Royal Nepalese Army thereby increasing the dependency of Nepal on India for the resolution of the problem both politically and militarily. Indian political leaders started to increase their stake in the Maoist problem, calling it a common problem. However, when the King of Nepal grabbed power on 1st February, Indian policy towards Nepal was in disarray. Although India criticised the royal coup and suspended her military assistance to Nepal, India seemed clueless as to how to handle the problem with Nepal.

Matters were made worse by the open display of confusion within the Indian establishment itself regarding the resumption of Indian military assistance to Nepal. After the King met the Indian Prime Minister Dr Man Mohan Singh on the sidelines of an Asian-African Summit in Jakarta in April, the Indian foreign minister seems to have told the journalists accompanying him back to New Delhi that India was resuming military assistance to Nepal. However, by the time Dr Singh returned to New Delhi and consulted his partners in the coalition government the story got changed: India had not after all taken a formal decision to resume military assistance to Nepal.

At present there is a stalemate in Indo-Nepal relations in terms of broader economic co-operation and a complete deadlock within Nepal in terms of resolving the Maoist problem and moving forward the political process. There does not seem to be any constructive dialogue between Nepal and India to address the whole gamut of Indo-Nepal relations and the conflict in Nepal has stalled efforts to work together for economic development.

The root causes of the problem in Nepal are poverty and underdevelopment. Unless these issues are addressed effectively it would be difficult to achieve peace. One of the keys to addressing these problems is to make Indo-Nepal relations work for the economic development of Nepal. What India could do here would be to take a twin-track policy, i.e., to play the role of a friendly neighbour as part of wider international efforts led by the UN to bring about peace to Nepal and move ahead at the same time with the process of democratising and modernising her relations with Nepal. By doing this, India would be enhancing the relevance of the UN at a time when she is seeking a permanent membership of the UN Security Council and making a positive contribution to the resolution of the current political problems in Nepal. There are several reasons why India’s claim for a permanent seat in the Security Council may be justifiable. As the largest and vibrant democracy in the world, India perhaps deserves a place at the high table of the international community. However, since India seems to be justifying her claim for permanent membership of the Security Council more as an Asian country and by implication to represent Asia, the world can expect India to demonstrate what leadership she has provided in managing at least the affairs of her own region.

Any claim of a leadership role comes with responsibilities, whether political or economic. Owing mainly to the lack of leadership and vision, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation has achieved little in spite of its being in existence since 1985. Most of India’s neighbours seem to have problems with New Delhi. When Mr I. K. Gujral was Prime Minister of India for a brief period in the mid-1990s, India demonstrated some vision and farsightedness which resulted in the conclusion of two major treaties – one with Bangladesh on sharing the waters of the River Ganges and another with Nepal on harnessing the waters of the River Mahakali. But this momentum was not sustained. Consequently, one of the treaties, the Mahakali Treaty, has become defunct. Thus, the challenge for India is to rise above narrow traditional national interests and demonstrate farsightedness and wisdom in her dealings with her neighbours, including Nepal. In the absence of this, the stagnant water in Indo-Nepal relations may remain stagnant for a long time to come and the water may be further muddied if India does not demonstrate her willingness to democratise her relations with Nepal.