By Salman Haidar
India’s decision to resume arms supplies to Nepal has come under a great deal of criticism: at home many see it as a retrograde step, and in Nepal it has dismayed the democratic opposition to the king.
That what is now to be sent is basically non-lethal material in the pipeline has made little difference, especially in Kathmandu, where it is seen essentially as a gesture of support to the king. To make matters worse, this has taken place at a time when the normally fractious political parties had finally come together to oppose the monarchy: these parties are now united in their disappointment with India.
India’s decision to resume limited arms supplies has been gestating for some time and could not have been an easy thing to do. New Delhi has assumed a conspicuously forward position against the royal coup in Nepal, and has taken many substantial steps to signal its strong disapproval.
The Dhaka SAARC Summit was a casualty, essentially because India was not willing to legitimise the king’s actions by providing him with access to that important forum. There was also an immediate clampdown on arms supplies where India led major countries like the USA and the UK in denying military supplies to Nepal. So now the easing of its wholesale opposition looks like backsliding, and that too for little apparent reason.
Media reports suggest that there were divided views within the Indian government on this matter, with the diplomats opposing resumption and the Army in support. There could be some truth in these reports but there is more to it than a simple matter of departmental infighting.
New Delhi faces a real dilemma in Nepal. It has been forced into an awkward choice on the arms issue and may well come up against similar uncomfortable choices in the future. No one can doubt India’s commitment to democracy, and there is little chance of any swing of Indian opinion away from the democratic political parties towards the King.
The present issue relates to the stability and coherence of Nepal, and the continuance of its established state structure. The Maoist threat is real. The king threw out parliamentary government because he claimed it was not handling the threat. Emergency was declared – now off, but severe constraints still apply – leading politicians have been in and out of jail, the media is controlled. Despite all the harsh measures, the royal regime has been no more successful in curbing the Maoists than the politicians, as recent attacks on Army posts have demonstrated. Moreover, the Maoists have teamed up with the others in joint opposition to the king, thus moving closer to the centre from the political periphery.
India has had to act in this deteriorating situation. Further loss of authority in Kathmandu could open the door to the Maoists, something that India can hardly afford to see. A Maoist Nepal would magnify India’s problems with similar groups in different parts of its own territory. Confusion and disorder can readily seep across the border if the Maoists gain further and team up with related groups in India.
In these circumstances the Indian authorities have felt it necessary to do something to give succour to Kathmandu. They seem to have judged that the insurgent threat needs an immediate response, while restoration of democracy must perforce come later.
There are some international ramifications that are not to be ignored. For one thing, there could be some revived anxieties about an enlarged Chinese role in Nepal. This touches an Indian nerve even if there is little substance in such a view. Earlier, Nepalese rulers have tried on occasion to play China against India, and New Delhi may be wary on this score.
The fact that its Ambassador was kept out in the cold for weeks by the royal palace can feed Indian concern. The present state of relations between New Delhi and Beijing, however, is satisfactory to both, and it would be surprising indeed if recent gains were to be tossed away for the sake of Nepal’s uncertain affairs.
More relevant at the international level is the active cooperation established in Nepal during the last few years between India, the USA and the UK. These three have coordinated their assistance to the Nepalese government to help it deal with the Maoists.
As the most closely engaged of the participants, it has fallen on India to take the lead. This is a new and significant development. Having in effect given up its former demand for exclusivity in such matters, India is now in a position to work closely with major powers to try to secure peace in its neighbourhood.
In a sense, what is taking place in Nepal can be regarded as something of a workshop for future strategic cooperation in the region between India and global powers.
For now, the challenge before New Delhi is to structure its policy carefully: some encouragement, some pressure. Without a dribble of arms, India may be depriving itself of a crucial instrument of persuasion. But it has to keep pushing at the same time for real democracy. Confronting the Maoists may be the present priority but promoting democracy cannot be left out of sight. It is a fine balance. India has to follow an active policy and will need to sort out conflicting approaches between its different departments. More important is to remain closely involved and to maintain continuous high-level contact with Kathmandu.