The Maoist leaders’ recent accusation that Nepal’s ruling politicians are remote controlled by India echoes the era of “special relations” with India in the 1950s. The traffic of Nepali politicians to Delhi has indeed been unusually high. Largely left out from the ‘ Delhi pilgrimage’, the Maoists now have called for “direct talk” with India to resolve issues at home. However, the Maoists need to understand that the increased Indian influence in Nepal results from the inability of Nepali politicians to work together.
By Pramod K. Kantha
Nepal’s political morass is deepening. Why is Nepal going in circles leaving all critical challenges shelved for a later date? The daily political drama in Kathmandu between the “stakeholders” has proved little beyond a game of trivial pursuit. While pinning the blame for this failure is debatable, the lives of common people in Nepal have suffered beyond imagination. By now, the routine sight of stinking garbage on the streets of Kathmandu is topped only by the disgusting and dysfunctional political elite whose obsession with their power and privileges is threatening Nepal’s very existence as an independent and livable nation. Yet, there are enormous opportunities to build a new Nepal, an aspiration that inspired hundreds of thousands of people to take part in April 2006 Jan Andolan.
Polarization over compromise
Hopes for a grand political settlement rekindled by November 2005 12-point understanding between Nepal’s embattled political parties and disoriented Maoists have not all gone in vain. April 2006 movement was the most sweeping reassertion of people’s power in Nepali history leading the way for a Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) formally ending the Maoist insurgency, Constituent Assembly elections (CA) in April 2008, and the abolition of monarchy in May. In their struggle against an uncompromising monarch, Nepal’s political parties, including the Maoists, made a convincing case of their ability to work together and draw support at home and abroad. The involvement of United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was reflective of broader international support for Nepal’s peace process. So, what went wrong? Why has it been so difficult to advance the peace process?
Nothing explains the current predicament of Nepal better than the inability of political operatives, both internal and external, to embrace the fast changing realities of new Nepal. The imperatives of the 12-point understanding were rooted in an impasse created by Nepal’s inability to resolve the contradictions of its political landscape by force. King Gyanendra’s reassertion of the bygone royal authority in the name of containing Maoist insurgency had reached a dead end. The Maoist’s dream of taking over Nepal faced intractable national as well as international resistance. Nepal’s political parties had realized that their struggle against autocratic policies of the King had little chance of success without taking the Maoists on board. External powers also understood these elements of the situation. The best and only way forward is compromise/accommodation beyond mindless polarization. King Gyanedra’s failure to comprehend the inherent nature of this situation made him the earliest loser.
The current political predicament of Nepal results from Nepali political leaders’ reluctance to recognize and internalize the series of agreements they signed beginning with the Delhi agreement.
The blame here goes all around. The Maoists top this list largely in view of their lack of sincerity to play by the agreed rules thereby raising a climate of endemic distrust that has ruled out collective action. The Maoists’ voluntary exit from power in the name of “civilian supremacy” has been counterproductive. As a result, the cantonment of Maoist combatants has not ended the situation of Maoist insurgency as the Maoists recognize no authority. Continuing Maoist agitation combined with repeated threat to forcibly takeover the state has made non-Maoist politicians helplessly dependent on Nepal Army and has undermined their ability to lead the military. The military has once again become central part of Nepal’s political dynamics, the bastion of defense against the recalcitrant Maoists, the center of hope for domestic as well as international actors against possible Maoist onslaught.
The conduct of Nepal’s other political parties has hardly been helpful. Instead of reaching out to the Maoists, the largest party in CA in the interest of advancing the constitution writing process, they remain overtaken by their fixation with power. The current coalition has rebuffed the need for a national “unity government.” Instead of providing effective governance and managing conflict, they have chosen to play “Machiavellian Politics” to stay in power. Instead of living by their pledge to honor rule of law and punish violators of human rights, they have chosen to condone the perpetrators, disregarding national and international appeals; this gives credence to the Maoist allegation about the lack of civilian supremacy. Continuous outcry by UN-OHRC and National Human Rights Commission and other civil society and international groups has gone unheard. One wonders if the non-Maoist politicians see compromise with “establishment forces” as a convenient route to power to compensate for their poor performance in the CA elections and their utter inability to govern. The end game does not augur well. As has been seen in the case of many other transitions from authoritarian regimes, politically indispensible military does not augur well for democracy. Hence, the non-Maoist politicians must act boldly to prove their democratic credentials intact; conviction not convenience will help in doing so.
Remote Control of Nepali politics
The Maoist leaders’ recent accusation that Nepal’s ruling politicians are remote controlled by India echoes the era of “special relations” with India in the 1950s. The traffic of Nepali politicians to Delhi has indeed been unusually high. Largely left out from the ‘ Delhi pilgrimage’, the Maoists now have called for “direct talk” with India to resolve issues at home. However, the Maoists need to understand that the increased Indian influence in Nepal results from the inability of Nepali politicians to work together. At the height of Nepal’s April 2006 movement, India had realized the limits of its leverage in Nepal. New Delhi, one hopes, has matured enough not to entertain the illusion of managing Nepal’s political mess from a desk at South Block. May 2009 elections may have removed the conflicting policy preferences of the left-front partners in India’s governing coalition for accommodating the Nepali Maoists but Nepal’s situation remains uncertain. India will remain consequential in Nepal’s political dynamics. But, stability and sustainable governance in Nepal can be built only on the foundation of a compromise that reflects the Nepali peoples’ aspirations for a democratic, transparent and accountable government.
(The author is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wright State University, Ohio, USA. He can be reached at: [email protected] )